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 A COOPERATIVE SECURITY ORDER FOR
ASIA-PACIFIC: INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON NEW
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
                                             By Swaran Singh1 (India)
Gradual end of the Cold war bipolar divide from mid-1980s had generated
trends for alternative paradigms of security in international politics. Thus moving
away from the collective security paradigm that had been tried since the early
part of 20th century, newer concepts like common security, comprehensive
security, and then cooperative security were to emerge as alternatives for seeking
stability and peace in inter-state ties. Amongst these, the concept of cooperative
security - which arrived only from early 1990s seems the one most suitable for
Asia-Pacific. This is partly because cooperative security carries elements from
both European conceptions of collective and common security as also Asian
principles of comprehensive security and has evolved an inclusive character
involving cooperation amongst both friends and adversaries. 2
This approach seems to conform to Asian ethos of seeking security-in-
peace rather than seeking peace-in-security. Also, having been successful in
Europe in creating a framework of Organization of Security Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE ), this cooperative security model has since come to be one that
portends to become increasingly most agreeable and effective concept in Asia-
Pacific with ASEAN taking the lead. This is so because the model of cooperative
security particularly suits Asian countries where (a) the region happens to be
too large and too diverse and (b) security threat remains often intrastate rather
than inter-state; making state sovereignty fulcrum of national security. In this
case cooperative security approach seeks to ensure security without
1. Dr Swaran Singh is Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi. He can be reached at swaransingh@hotmail.com
2. Proposed first by Canadian Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, Joe Clark, at the
September 1990 UN General Assembly session this has since been evolved amongst others
by Canadians like Gareth Evans and Axworthy and in the broadest implies “ common
security of states to be promoted or obtained through their cooperative efforts “ though
it “ indicates a greater diversity of security policies and predicaments “ than the term
common security while “ both acknowledge the necessity to think comprehensively “. See
J.Soedjati Djiwondono, “Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific-Pacific Region: An ASEAN
Perspective “, The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. XXII No.3, p.206; also David Dewitt,
“Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security “, The Pacific Review, Vol. 7 No.1,
(1994), p.7
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undermining national security and, instead of trying to eliminate the means of
war and causes of conflict it tries to have more modest objectives of building
confidence and preventing and managing conflicts. At the same time, it moves
beyond bilateral as also purely military approach to security. 3
It is in this backdrop of increasing acceptability of cooperative security
framework in various soft-security and foreign policy forums around Asia-
Pacific that watershed events like 9/11 and the follow-up US  war on international
terrorism-especially US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as new tenor of
six-party talks on North Korean nuclear program-have triggered both positive
as well as negative new trends that provide several new challenges as well as
opportunities for the future of common security. Given this context, this paper
makes an attempt to examine some of these emerging trends in order to highlight
strengths and limitation of cooperative security as a model and to see how
recent events impinge on the future of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific
in the coming years.
Trends of Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific
Traditionally, Asia-Pacific has had no history of indigenous multilateral
cooperative approach to security. 4  Nevertheless, end of Cold War divide had
witnessed national security strategies in Asia-Pacific moving towards
cooperative security framework with ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) taking the
lead. 5  In this, the economic success of ASEAN has become the most effective
pillars of cooperative multilateral strategy in Asia-Pacific. Especially, rise of
China as economic powerhouse followed by its proactive role in the East Asian
financial crisis of mid -1990s had generated new avenues for other local actors
to play the lead in strengthening the indigenous character of Asian
multilateralism. Since then, countries like China, India and Japan have been
3 Alan Dupont, ‘Concepts of Security “, in Jim Rolfe (ed.), Unresolved Futures:
Comprehensive Security in Asia-pacific-Pacific, (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies,
1995), pp.9-10; also Dipanker Banerjee, “Towards Comprehensive and Cooperative
Security in South Asia-Pacific “, South Asia-Pacific Survey, Vol. 6 No. 2 (1999), p.312
4. Graig A.Snyder, “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea
“, Asia-pacific Perspective, Vol.23 No.1 (Spring 1997), p. 19; also Barry Buzan and Gerald
Segal, “Rethinking East Asia-Pacific Security “,  Survival, Vol. XXXYI No.2 (Summer
1994), p.15.
5. These trends for cooperative multilateral security amongst ASEAN can be traced
back to 1976 when ASEAN Heads of State and government meeting in Bali had resulted in
signing of their Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which lays down common rules and
norms for cooperation with ASEAN as also between ASEAN and other regional players.
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expanding their engagement between themselves as also with ASEAN countries.
These and other major players have not only been active members of ARF but
China, India and Japan have already outlined their plans to establish free trade
areas with ASEAN which carries seeds of potentially facilitating  the emergence
of larger Asia-Pacific identity. 6
The United States for long had continued to be reluctant to move beyond
its system of bilateral alliances and military bases as means for managing security
in Asia-Pacific. Indeed, several US allies in Asia-Pacific were equally reluctant
to try any new approaches and to have anyone other than US play the balancer
in Asia-Pacific.  Most of their reluctance flows from rise of China and this had
been the major cause behind their skepticism about encouraging cooperative
security trends in Asia-Pacific. However, given the ASEAN lead and success,
the US itself was to gradually recognize importance of cooperative multilateralism
in Asia-Pacific. However, acceptance of cooperative security beyond ASEAN
and ARF has continued to be a slow process and while nations are willing to
consider this framework to deal with peripheral issues they still prefer bilateral
channels when it comes to debating core issues of their security and they still
rely on militaries when it comes to enduring and intractable disputes which
generally revolve around claims to territories and resources with nation-building
still being work-in-progress.7  However, beginning from early 1990s, the
acceptance levels of states to debate core issues of national security at least in
the Track-II multilateralism has since evolved a stronger profile. 8
The post 9/11 events have once again revived the debate on whether the
cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region  will evolve as balance of power
or concert of power approach in the coming years. 9  And, though the larger
trend has been clearly emerging in favor of later approach-and more recent
tenor of six-party talks on North Korean nuclear program clearly established
6.. Muthian Alagappa, Asia-Pacific Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,
( California : Stanford University Press, 1998 ), p.640
7. Desmond Ball, “ A New Era in Confidence Building : The Second-track Process in the
Asia-Pacific/ Pacific Region “, Security Dialogue, Vol.xxv No.2 ( June 1994 ), p.173; also
Paul M.Evans, “ The Prospects for Multilateral Cooperation in the Asia-pacific/ Pacific
Region “, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol.xvii No.1 ( March 1995 ), p.203
8. Graig A.Snyder, ‘ Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea
“, Asia pacific Perspective, Vol.23 No.1 ( Spring 1997 ), p.18
9. See Susan Shirk, “ Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of
Power? “ in David.A.Lake and Patrick Morgan, ( eds.), Regional Orders and Security in a
New World, ( University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997 ), pp.245-
270
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that argument-the case of US action in Iraq ( especially its bypassing of the UN
mandate ) seems to revive the balance of power theologies. 10  If one were to go
by the basic understanding of cooperative security system where the threats
are not premised to be existential but only those flowing from mutual distrust
and misperceptions and the relational identity not necessarily negative, or is
only minimally so, and it may even be positive then it is not merely US action in
Iraq but the precarious nature of larger inter-state relations in Asia-Pacific
projects creation of cooperative security order at best a slow and reluctant
process in-the-making.
Concert of Powers Approach to North Korea
The six-party talks have been the first effective mechanism of cooperative
security in Asia-Pacific which remains outside ARF which has been driven
mainly by Southeast Asia’s ASEAN. These talks have been partly so fashioned
by the fact that US has been opposed to allowing North Korea into ARF and
North Korea has been opposed to South Korean proposals for Northeast Asian
security forum which it believes to be a US sponsored effort to contain
Pyongyang. At the same time, given absence of bilateral diplomatic ties between
North and South Korea bilateral channels have also been largely unavailable
and ineffective making six-party talks most decisive and effective forum for
ensuring security against nuclear threats in Asia-Pacific.
China has been the only outside power which is believed to have both
access and influence with Pyongyang which has also contributed to the making
of Concert of Powers approach a possibility. The shifting of locale from Europe
to Asia as also expansion of four-party talks into six-party talks portends several
new trends in-the-making. First and foremost, this has strengthened the
framework of Seoul’s proposed North East Asian Security Dialogue ( NEASED
) and, in spite of US reluctance and muted opposition, this seems to clearly
strengthen the independent character of cooperative security framework in
North East Asia with China emerging as new nucleus of this strategy. In this,
more recent trends have been influenced by the new leadership in Beijing
playing a far more assertive role during the last two rounds of six-party talks
hosted in Beijing. Amongst others, though reluctantly, and at the urging of
Japan and South Korean leadership, US has gradually begun to endorse China’s
10. Gu Guoliang, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption “, The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 26 No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 140-141
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lead in this entire effort which only further strengthens this Asian character of
these cooperative security framework in Asia-Pacific. 11
But China’s multilateralism, of course, remains selective. While its seeks
a proactive role in building confidence and resolving disputes in Central Asia
and has evolved a more neutral approach to what was once described as South
Asian nuclear competition, Beijing continues to keep low profile vis-à-vis other
East Asian states where it promotes discussions and verbal confidence building
yet wishes to tackle more serious disputes bilaterally. This reluctance clearly
flows from China’s disputes with Taiwan and around its claims to the South
China Sea. The US actions in response to 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq and its
increased military presence in Asia-Pacific seems also guided by same logic of
supporting multilateralism on soft-issues but acting unilaterally or in bilateral
context when it comes to dealing with more imminent threats to its interests and
objectives. Policy of India has also been on similar lines.
Cooperative Security Policies of China
To first look at China’s example, while during the Cold War the communist
leadership in Beijing had primarily depended on its hard-power of military and
aid-diplomacy for ensuring its security, China’s opening up from late 1970s and
especially the post-Cold War years have witnessed China introducing wide
range of soft-power options including political, economic, and social measures
for the purpose with its military means becoming less relevant and gradually
becoming less active even in China’s domestic politics. 12 Ideas like
Constructivism and actors like non-governmental organizations have begun to
exercise influence in China and Chinese scholars have begun to challenge the
traditions and seek to reform incumbent systems and theories. 13 US on the
other hand perhaps have sought refuge in their return to realism and neo-
realism which have gained ground in view of US global war on terrorism.
11. Leon Sigal ( Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Council, Social Science
Research Council ), “ The Six-Party Talks Can Succeed “, 3 February 2004 at http://
www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateral Talks/Sigal_SixPartyTalks.htm
12. Zi Zhong Yun, “ Guoji Guanxi Li lun yu Zhongguo: bijiao yu jiejian “ Yantoa hui
fayan xuan deng (xia), ( International Relations Theory and China: Comparison and
derivations “ Conference Selection of Speeches ( Part II ), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (
World Economics and International Politics), 2003 Issue 5 ( may 2003), p.35.
13. Yan Xue-tong, “ Guoji Guanxi Lilun yu da duo guanxi yanjiu “ ( International
Relations Theory and Study of Big Power Relations ), Shijie Jinji yu Zhenzhi ( World
Economics and International Politics ), 2003 Issue 5 ( May 2003 ), p.36
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In terms of its domestic trends, beginning from early 1980s China’s
economic integration with the outside world has resulted in China’s increasing
political confidence in multilateral forums and regimes in promoting China’s
national security. This has replaced China’s belief in confrontation with dialogue,
compromise and cooperation as dominant traits of China’s foreign policy debates
and decision-making. As a result, China’s changing role within ARF- from
passive to active- indicates that Beijing has begun to embrace the notion of
cooperative security. Similarly, China’s contribution to the political settlement
of the Cambodian issue (including withholding support from its long term
ideological ally, the Khmer Rouge ) and its help in brokering the US-North
Korean negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear program suggests a paradigm
shift in China’s policy.14
Cooperative Security Strategies of India
Chinese response to the evolution of Concert of Powers type cooperative
security paradigm in North East Asia has been critical in influencing the thinking
in New Delhi. However, other than this China factor, New Delhi has also had
several other equally important factors that determine its response to the
emerging new trends in favor of cooperative multilateralism in Asia-Pacific
region. First and foremost for India, it was the collapse of former Soviet Union
on the one hand and India’s opening up and reforms on the other that had
compelled a serious rethinking on India’s security and foreign policy priorities
leading to India’s greater integration with various local, regional and global
networks of security policy making. In this context, given the fact that India
had for long been a victim of terrorism and that this terrorism had become
problematic for its growing cross-border linkages, the 9/11 events were to provide
a further push to India’s commitment to cooperative security.
As could be expected, India was to make this policy shift in a Joint
Statement along with the successor state of its former ally. It was as part of
India-Russia Joint Moscow Declaration of November 2001 and later, during
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s second visit to Moscow-as part of his address to the
14. See for example, “ DPRK and China Discuss Nuclear Issue “, Korean News Agency
of the DPRK  ( now onwards KCNA), 30 October 2003; Benjamin Kang Lim, “ China
Urges US to be more flexible on N.Korea”, Reuters, 15 December 2003; “ DPRK Foreign
Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks “, KCNA, 28 December 2003; Glenn Kessler, “
U.S.Disavows Trip to North Korea: Experts’ Possible Visit to Nuclear Facility Is Termed
Unofficial “, Washington Post, 3 January 2004; David E. Sanger, “ Visitors See North
Korean Nuclear Capacity “, New York Times, 11 January 2004
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Russian Academy of Sciences that-India had formally called for the creation of
“ a new cooperative security order “ and asserted India’s opposition “ to
unilateralism in international matters “ which clearly implied the opposition to
US unilateralism. 15 But at the same time India had also been building close
relations with the US and has since described its growing defense cooperation
with US as part of efforts at “enhancing cooperative security”. 16 However, far
clearer has been India’s formulations in context of its Look East Policy.
Starting from ASEAN- Indian summit in Cambodia during November 2002,
India has launched several regional and sub-regional initiatives that remain
premised on its fundamental belief in multilateralism and cooperative strategy.
These new initiatives have already begun to show their positive spillover effects
in India’s policies in its immediate periphery especially in India’s dealing with
Pakistan and its initiatives on Kashmir. For example, addressing a gathering at
Singapore’s Institute of South East Asia-Pacific Studies ( ISEAS ) during his
April 2002 visit to this region, Prime Minister Vajpayee had acknowledged
India’s interest and confidence about cooperative security being an ideal
approach to dealing with non-military threats to security. 17
In practice, India’s active participation in ARF and India’s expanding and
regular military exercises with all major players in the Asia-Pacific also indicates
increasing comfort with cooperative and multilateral approach to security. This
has also witnessed  India focusing on building confidence with both its friends
and its adversaries. India’s gradual opening up during the 1990s has also added
a strong economic component to its expanding interactions with Asia-Pacific.
Indeed, India’s Look East Policy (which now looks far beyond ASEAN and
treats its immediate periphery of Myanmar and Indo-China as India’s bridge to
the Asia-Pacific ) has expended their mutual interdependence making India
develop stakes in the Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, India continues to be selective
and feels reluctant in supporting collective security strategies when it comes to
more intractable and enduring security threats like Kashmir question where the
change in India’s attitude has been imperceptive and piecemeal at best.
15. P.S.Suryanaraana, “Joint Statement Calls for Cooperative Security Order “, The
Hindu (New Delhi), 7 November 2001; also Amit Baruah, “Help evolve multipolar world:
PM”, The Hindu (New Delhi), 13 November 2003
16. “Joint Statement on US-India Defense Policy Group”,  US Department of State,
Press Statement  8 August 2003 at http:// www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/pr/23209/htm
17. “ PM wants security framework for Asia-pacific: Indian Offers judge to try Khmer
leaders “, The Tribune ( Chandigarh, India ), 10th April 2002
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Cooperative Security Order will grow only piecemeal?
To be successful and effective in Asia-Pacific region, the principles,
purposes and procedures of cooperative security will have to evolve a distinct
Asian identity of their own. And, even in ideal circumstances of all important
players in Asia-Pacific being in its favor is going to take time and given lack of
such traditions and complicating problems since 9/11 this is not going to be an
easy task. To begin with one can outline some of the more basic distinct elements
of Asia-Pacific region which must kept in mind in creating a cooperative security
framework for this region.
Firstly, given their strong emphasis on national sovereignty, Asian
conception of cooperative security sees no role for either collective security or
regional security when it comes to their domestic conflicts.
Secondly, unlike examples of Europe, it is difficult to find military parity in
Asia-Pacific context of inter-state rivalries and their inequalities become
particularly stark when the economic component is introduced. 18
Thirdly, Asia-Pacific states as yet also do not envisage collective or
regional security resolving their international conflicts especially if methodology
involves collective use of  force.
Fourthly, cooperative approach also remains ineffective when it comes
to intractable and long-standing disputes where bilateral approach is solicited.
And finally, the Asia-Pacific states emphasis political agreements on long
range goals, diversity and equality, consensus-building and face-saving informal
networking and the fostering of interpersonal relations, unilateral and voluntary
disclosures and concessions, incrementalism, negotiations, and focus on non-
controversial areas, at least to begin with.
In the end, therefore, multilateral approach to cooperative security remains
confined to conflict prevention and confidence building and any binding and
any verifiable regimes about conduct of militaries yet remains outside the pale
of Asia-Pacific cooperative security strategies and any progress in creating a
cooperative security order in Asia-Pacific is, therefore, bound to be piecemeal.
Also, it will have to account for local features and needs of security which
means that debates on cooperative security in Asia-Pacific must remain flexible
18. This inequalities are further complicated by external linkages and interventions as
also by the fact that most Asia-pacific states remain economically vulnerable to big
players which often becomes the critical determining factor of inter-state equations that
hinders any local initiative towards cooperative security solutions. See Arjun Makhijani, “
Common Security is far off “, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 46  No. 4, and (May
1990).
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and open ended. In this manner, the evolving Asia-Pacific approach will have
to evolve its own independent identity that maybe different from that of the
West which places a high premium on concrete goals, immediate benefits, and
binding agreements with provisions for verification and compliance and
arbitration of disputes. 19
Likely Future Trends
The recent activism of US in dealing with international terrorism has
generated several forces which, if properly spruced up, will in the long-run
provide critical support to the evolution of multilateral cooperative security
order in Asia-Pacific. For example, there is a clear realization from this experience
that any response to the menace of international terrorism must involve
international consensus. This clearly marks a paradigm shift of the super power
military capability finally accepting itself to be ineffective unless supported by
a cooperative multilateral strategy for building security through building
confidence. To quote from US National Security Strategy for 2002, “The United
States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should
nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. “ 20
In practice, response to these new threats to security will have to be
effected through multilateral institutions rather than nation-states alone
howsoever powerful may be the state is the state in question. Also, given the
nature of terrorism being so fluid, diverse and widespread, any response will
have to be so fashioned as to coordinate counter-measures strategies globally,
but to achieve operational effectiveness of these strategies in tactics rooted
locally with local State and non-state actors playing the lead. Even in case of
state-sponsored terrorism or in case of rogue state, any coercion may not
desiccate terrorism and may result in terrorist response even by countermeasures
like targeted state proliferating dangerous technologies to terrorist or other
rogue states. External coercion may also be used by local terrorist organization
to force such states to relent its commitments to non-proliferation and non-
aggression. Also, if few states project themselves as privileged to carry out
campaign against international terrorism this could generate reluctance and
resistance even amongst its friends and allies. In such a scenario, cooperative
19. Muthian Alagappa, Asia-Pacific Security Practice: Material and Ideational
Influences, ( California: Stanford University Press, 1998 ), p.643
20. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,
p.15.
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security will have strengths of (a) being grounded in international consensus,
norms and institutions and (b) evolve its pragmatic response in appropriate
manner to maximize outcomes of their efforts.
Conclusion
To conclude, therefore, Asia seems moving inevitably towards creating a
Concern of Powers type cooperative security framework and given the nature
of states and security threats in the Asia-Pacific cooperative security order
promises to be the most appropriate strategy for ensuring security for such a
diverse set of states with such diverse security threats and vulnerabilities. In
the evolution of such order possible, India amongst others sees an important
role for itself and has been working in direction of building confidence and
dialogue in various security and foreign policy forums with several new
initiatives having been taken during the recent past.
This paradigm shift in India’s security thinking has a direct correlation
with India’s rising self-confidence as also by external factors like rising US
presence in Asia-Pacific region. Amongst others, India is aware of other player’s
role and of the fact that rising China, being at the centre of Asia-Pacific, will be
playing a critical role in the evolution of cooperation security framework in this
region. And amongst critical recent trends China’s leading role in six-party talks
on North Korean nuclear program portends to play a critical experiment in the
evolution of cooperation security framework for Asia-Pacific region.
